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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------------------------------------------------------------
JULIA HOTTINGER, and • . 
LAMONT DASTRUP, 
-vs-
ETHEL 
. 
. 
Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, . . 
Case No. 18147 
• . 
R. JENSEN, . . 
Defendant . . 
and Respondent. 
. 
. 
Appeal from a Judgment in the Sixth Judicial District 
Court, Sanpete County, the Honorable Don v. Tibbs presiding. 
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ISSUE PRESENTED 
·~ ,~ 
Whether the requirements of "Boundary by Acquiescence" 
are satisfied in the factual situation where a common owner 
conveys away part of his estate and for 15 years the-·abutting 
owners agreed to, knew and understood a certain fence line was 
the boundary but where the present abutt_ing owners , purchased 
.;• 
., 
the disputed property without knowing the fence line was the 
boundary, but who nevertheless made no claim to any property 
beyond said fence until some 7 years had elapsed in addition 
to the stated 15 year period. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent owned certain property in 1958; in that same 
year, Respondent conveyed a portion of said property to Ray 
.. ~. 
and Georgia Jones. The property in question was subsequently 
conveyed and sold by Jones' to N.E. Anglin, and subsequently 
conveyed and sold by Anglin to Denton A. Dove. In 1973, 
Dove sold __ the property in question to LaMont Dastrup and Julia 
Hottinger, Appellants in this case. 
The facts~· are undisputed that when the property was sold 
in 1958 it was agreed and understood that the boundary between 
the portion that was sold to Jon.es' and that remaining to the 
Respondent was the most obvious and visible cedar post and 
... 
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net wire fence line in question. When Jones' sold the property 
to N.E. Anglin it was agreed, known and understood that the fence 
line in question was the boundary line. When Anglin subsequent-
~ ".'). - -
ly sold the property to Dove, it was agreed, known and understood 
that the fence line was the boundary line. When the property 
was sold by Dove to LaMont Dastrup and Julia Hottinger, the 
Appellants in' this case in 1973, there is no representation 
as to where the boundary line was, but the fence was treated 
as the boundary line. 
When Appellants acquired the property in 1973 they made no 
claim to any property opposite the Appellants side of the fence 
in question until 1980, when a survey was performed and an 
assertion was made by Appellants to ownership of property oppo-
site their side of the fence in question. The fence line in 
question has been acquiesced in as a boundary line between 
the Appellants, their predecessors in interest and.the Res-
pendent from 1958 to 1980. 
The disputed property in question-has been used by 
Respondent since 1945 when she acquired it as a lawn and part 
of a yard on the east side of her home, and also as a garden 
spot to the south of her home. The garden area has been fre-
quently tilled and of course the lawn and yard part has been 
maintained. In 1980 Appellants performed a survey and determined 
that their deeds called for property on Respondent's side 
- 3 -
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of the fence, whereupon claim was made by Appellants to 
property on Respondent's side of the fence up to within a 
few feet of her home. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY 
ACQUIESCENCE HAVE BEEN SATISFIED. 
The law seems to be clear in the State of Utah that the 
necessary elements for establishment.of "Boundary by Acquies-
cence" are.as follows: 
[a] Occupation to a visible line marked by 
monuments fences or buildings. 
[b] Acquiescence in the division line as 
the property. 
[c] Acquiescence for a long period of time. 
[d] Acquiescence by adjoining land owners. 
Holmes -vs- Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009· (1906); Tripp -vs-
Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912 (1928); Brown -vs- Milliner, 
120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202 (1951). 
When the preceding requirements are met, a presumption 
arises that the parties have agreed that the boundary should 
be the one in which they acquiesced, wholly apart from whether 
or not an actual agreement was made. However, in spite of proof 
that these prerequisites exist, the presumption is a rebuttable 
one. Holmes -vs- Judge, (supra). 
- 4 -
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In Lane -vs- Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P.2d 1199 (1973); 
·~ 
the Utah· Supreme Court in the application of ,the "Boundary by 
Acquiescence" doctrine, when it was urged_up9n the Court 
that there was no evidence showing the fence was mutually 
intended to be the boundary, the Court said: 
"To this we say that the test to establish the 
boundary by "acquiescence" necess~rily need not 
be based on mutual "intent". "Intent" is not 
synonymous with "acquiescence" in these cases. 
"Acquiescence" is more nearly synonymous with 
"indolence", or "consent by silence" .. " 
In the instant case from 1958 to 1973, the adjoining 
property owners agreed, knew and understood that the boundary 
between them and the Respondent was the fence line in question. 
In 1973 when Appellants acquired the property, their acquiescence 
in the fence line as the boundary, continued until the survey 
was taken in 1980, at which time they made claim to the disputed. 
property. The trend of the law in Utah favors the time period 
to exceed 20 years except in unusual circumstances. Hobson -vs-
Panguitch Lake Corporation, 530 P.2d 792 (Utah 1975); Fuoco 
-vs- Williams, 18 Utah 2d 282, 421 P.2d 944 (1966). The Utah 
Supreme Court has lessened that requirement and in a case involving 
an acquiescence for less than 8 years, the Court held that 
"Boundary by Acquiescence" doctrine was applicable with less 
- 5 -
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than 8 years being sufficient to establish the acquiescence. 
Ekberg -vs- Bates, 239 P.2d 205 (1951) • 
. under 'the facts of the instant case, there was acquiescence 
in the fence line as the boundary fromr 1958 to 1980 when the 
survey was taken. The law is cle.ar in· the State of Utah that 
where the above referred to four elements exist as the necessary 
prerequisites for establishing a valid ~oundary by acquiescence, 
the burden of proof in establishing the rebuttable presumption 
• 
is clearly on the party who challenges the presumption created 
in "Boundary by Acquiescence". King -vs- Fronk, 14 Utah 135, 
378 P.2d 893 .(1966). 
The cases cited by Appellants, Hopson -vs- Panguitch Lake 
Corporation, (supra); Halls -vs- Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 (Otah 1979); 
and Wright ~vs- Clissold, 521 ~.2d 1224 (Utah 1974); are 
distinguishable from the instant case. 
In the Hobson case (supra), the agreement establishing 
the fence line was made by a party who did not own the property 
at the time the agreement was made. 
In the Halls case (supra) , the fence was erected off the 
true boundary line not by agreement, but for specific purposes 
of allowing for an expected road to be constructed and to control 
livestock. 
In the Wright case (supra) , the fence was erected not 
to establish a boundary, but to control cattle. 
In the instant case, Appellants predecessors in interest 
- 6 -
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I 
. ,,: 
' ~·' 1 
, . 
... 
~~~: expressly agreed, knew and understo6d that the fence in question 
- -
was the boundary ___ and Appellants by th~ir conduct or lack of it, 
treated the fence line as the boundary until 1980. 
In Hobson (supra), the Court stated: 
"The very reason for being of the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence or agreement is that 
in the interest of preserving the 1peace and good 
order of society and quietly resting bones of 
the past, which no one seems to have been 
troubled or complained about for a long number 
of years, should not be unearthed for the purpose 
of stirring up controversy, but should be left 
to th • e II eir r pose • • . Id. at 794. 
:· .. ~ 
Point II 
I 
EQUITY DEMANDS AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION. 
· Based upon the stipulated facts, it is clear that Appellants 
predecessors in interest and the Respondent agreed, knew and 
understood that the well marked and visible fence line in 
question was the boundary respected by each party. When 
Respondent, now over 80 years of age, intended to convey to 
Jones' in 1958, the intent was to make the fence line the 
boundary. Unfortunately, when a third party prepared a deed 
r 
setting forth a meets and bounds description for execution 
I 
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by Respondent and conveyance to Appellants' predecessors in 
interest, the meets and bounds description did not ~omport to 
the intent of the parties. Unfortunately, the Respondent 
was without sufficient expertise to determine from the des-
cription that it was in contradition to the parties intent. 
The Appellants' predecessors in .interest and the Appellants 
who acquired the prop$rty in 1973 to 198~, always understood 
and by action treate·a the boundary line between the parties 
as the fence ·1ine. They never possessed or made any claim 
to the disputed property until 1980 when a survey was taken. 
A finding for the Appellants would result in a lose of the 
Respondent's lawn and trees and garden spot, and put the property 
boundary within a few feet from the Respondent's home, which 
was certainly not the intention, and would create an unfair 
result to the Respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the Respondent's contention· that the four pre-
requisites to establish "Boundary by Acquiescence" have been 
established. That acquiescence has continued for in excess 
of 20 years, or that if it has not, the facts create an unusual 
circumstance thereby lessening the generally viewed 20 year 
requirement and 15 years being sufficient to establish the 
doctrine. That Appe_llants have failed to rebut the presumption 
- 8 -
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created"by.the.Respondent meeting the prerequisites. 
Respondent ~espectfully requests the lower court's 
decision. be: affirmed. 
DATED this day of January, 1982. 
CH KNECHT 
Attorney fo the Respondent 
50 North Main Street 
Manti, Utah 84642 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies 
.;: ... 
of R~spondent's Brief to: Dale M~ Darius, Esquire, Attorney at Y 
Law, Post Office Box u,·29 South Main Street, Brigham City, 
Utah, 84302, postage fully prepaid thereon, this /qfJ:-' day 
of January, 1982. 
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